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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM:
FROM THE SIXTH TO SEVENTH NATIONAL PARTY
CONGRESS*
Carlyle A. Thayer
The 'regularization of politics' -
In 1991 Vietnam held the seventh national congress ofthe Vietnam CommunistParty
(VCP). This marks an important step in what I have termed 'the regularization of
politics' in Vietnam (Thayer 1988). The VCP was founded 61 years ago. Until
unification in 197S national party congresses were infrequent events and were rarely
held within the time period stipulated by party statutes. Some nine years elapsed
between the 1951 second congress and the third congress held in September 1960. A
further sixteen years passed before the party held its fourth national congress in 1976.
Since then, however, national party congresses have been held on schedule, once
every five years. The fifth congress was held in March 1982, the sixth in December
1986 and the seventh in June 1991.
For most of its existence the VCP has been led by the same generation of
revolutionaries who founded the party. Up until the seventh congress, for example,
only 30 individuals had served on the highest decision-making body, the Politburo
(bo chinh tri). This elite leadership group is noted for its remarkable degree of unity
and cohesion. (In fact it was possible to discern a unique Vietnamese leadership style
or 'operational code' (see Thayer 1984 for a discussion of these categories). For
example, Ho Chi Minh served as president of the party from 19S1 to his death in
1969. LeDuan served as party first secretary/secretary-general from 1960 to his death
in 1986. During the period from 1951 to 1976, with the exception of individuals
dropped from the Politburo in 1956 as a result oferrors committed in the course ofthe
land reform campaign, there have beenno dismissals or purges ofPolitburo members.
Throughout the period up to 1976, the Central Committee was also dominated by
veteran revolutionaries first elected to the Central Committee in 1951 or of the same
generation elected in 1960.
* This paper was initially presented to 'Vietnam 1991: An Update', organized by the Department of
Human Geography and the Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific
Studies, Australian National University, on 25 October 1991 .
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AnadonalcongressoftheViemamConununistPartyhasthreemainfunctions.lt
elects the leadership— the central committee, the politburo and the secretary-general,
as well as specialized bodies such as the secretariat and control committee. Secondly,
the national congress considers and approves various reports, including an economic
report which covers future developments up to die next party congress. Thirdly, the
national congress may approve changes to the party's statutes and rules.
Prior to 1976, the Vietnamese political process was controlled by a very small
elite who were rarely held to account by the party at large for the execution of their
duties or for party policy. For example, the Politburo and Central Committee elected
in 1960 went for sixteen years before its stewardship came under scrutiny by the
party's rank and file.
What has changed since unification? First, the party leadership is now held
accountable on a regular basis. Senior party leaders must present written reports
outlining how they have acquitted their responsibilities since the last party congress.
These reports are extensively discussed and critically reviewed in the lead-up to the
congress and at the congress itself.
Secondly, the sectoral composition of the party Central Committee has altered
(see Thayer 1988 for a discussion of these categories). In the past the Central Com
mittee was composed overwhelmingly of very senior party officials (members of the
Politburo), senior party officials who served in the central party and state bureau
cracy, and to a lesser extent, by senior military officers. Since unification provincial
level party officials and other secondary level officials have been brought into the
Central Committee (Table 1). Military representation declined between I960 and
1986 and rose slightly at the seventh congress in 1991.
The third development since unification has been the institutionalization of
leadership change. Incompetent or corrupt officials have been dropped from the
Central Committee. At the same time, the VCP has attempted to manage the process
ofgenerational transition. This process is mostdramatic on the Politburo. Whereas no
Politburo member was dropped or retired in 1960 and only one individual was
dropped in 1 976, the process since then has been unprecedented Six individuals were
retired in 1982, another six retired in 1986, and a further seven retired in 1991. In
addition, one Politburo member was expelled in March 1990.
The pattern of change involving members of the Central Committee is illustrated
in Table 2. These figures show that there is a regular turnover of membership on the
Central Committee. Figures for the period 1960-91 indicate that approximately 45
per cent of members are retained from the previous Central Committee; another 19
per cent are promoted from alternate status (where they had no voting rights); and 35
per cent are new members who have not served at national level before.
Table 1: Sectoral composition oftheVCP Central Committee, 1960-91 (%)*
Sectoral Category 7950 1976 1982 1986 1991
SENIOR PARTY (28) (17) (15) (11) (9)
Central Party/State 26 22 32 27 27
NewCentral Party/State 20 20 10 5 13
COMBINED CENTRAL (46) (42) (42) (32) (40)
Secondary Party/State 11 3 18 25 28
New Secondary PartyState 0 23 12 24 15
COMBINED SECONDARY (11) (26) (30) (49) (43)
Military 2 3 10 5 5
New Military 13 3 10 5 4
COMBINED MILITARY (15) (16) (13) (7) (9)
TOTAL (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
•The data in this table should be taken as suggestive rather than definitive. There were problems of
missing, contradictory or incomplete data on certain individuals which made classification difficult.
Because of this problem, it was felt that the category combined total in the three instances above
would be a more accurate guide to the sectoral composition of the Central Committee.
Table 2: Retention and promotion rates on the VCP Central Committee
(full members")
I960 1976 1982 1986 Wl Avg~(n=46) (n-101) (n=U6) (n = U6) (n = 146) (n=105)
Retained1* 18(39%) 36(36%) 61(52.5%) 65(56%) 65(44%) 45.5%
Promoted0 11(24%) 10(10%) 23(20.0%) 21(18%) 33(23%) 19.0%
New* 17(37%) 55(54%) 32(27.5%) 30(26%) 48(33%) 353%
Notes:
The alternate category was dropped at the seventh congress in 1991.
b held over from the previous Central Committee as a full member.
c change of status from alternate to full member.
d not previously an alternate member.
Taken together, the processes of leadership accountability, expanded sectoral
representation and institutionalization ofleadership change constitute the 'regulariza-
tion' of the political process in Vietnam at the elite level. This paper will now address
itself to political change in Vietnam between the sixth and seventh national party
congresses before turning to a discussion of the seventh national congress itself.
Doi Moi— renovation1
Vietnam's political reform process predates the landmark 1986 sixth national party
congress which popularized the expression doi moi. The 1982 fifth national party
congress, for example, addressed itself to ending the chaotic overlap between party
and state institutions (Thayer 1991). Political (and economic) reform initiatives
pursued after the fifth congress achieved limited results. It was in this context that a
consensus emerged within the VCP in favour of a comprehensive reform package.
Vietnam's reformers found a potential ally in CPSU General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev, who came to power in 1985 and who was pursuing his own reform
program which stressed openness (glasnost) and restructuring (perestroika).
In 1986, at the sixth national VCP congress, Vietnam formally embarked on the
path of doi moi or renovation. The sixth congress, in effect, ratified and adopted as
national policy a reform process which had been under way for a number of years. In
the political sphere, Vietnam's policy of renovation led to limited attempts at democ
ratization These efforts were given much less prominence and publicity by outside
observers and writers.
In reviewing the period between the fifth and sixth party congress, the VCP
Central Committee came to the conclusion that 'the errors and shortcomings in
economic and social leadership originated from shortcomings in the party's ideologi
cal and organizational activity and its cadre work. This lays at the root of all other
causes' ('Political Report' 1986; Vietnam News Agency, 15 December 1986).2 The
VCP therefore decided at the sixth congress to carry out limited political reforms by
renovating the party organization and the state apparatus (including the National
Assembly); loosening controls over the press and media, and implementing a regime
of socialist legality (rule of law). According to the 'Political Report' of the VCP
Central Committee to the sixth congress:
...there exist in our society some abnormal phenomena, that is a lack of coherence
between the party, the state and the people; bureaucracy in the leading and manage
ment bodies, and in those organizations specially entrusted with mass work. The main
cause is that the mechanism which co-ordinates the activities of the party, the people
and the state has not yet been concretised into institutions.
The 'Political Report' also noted:
To strengthen the effectiveness of the management by the state means, first and
foremost, to uphold the role of the National Assembly and the State Council, and of
the people's councils at all levels. At present, popularly elected bodies at different
levels are still selected, elected and functioning in a formalist way. In many cases,
party committees at various levels run the whole show, doing the work of state
organs. The selection of people into elected bodies in many places is done in a
forcible manner. Many people's committees do not really respect the people's coun
cils....
It is apressing task to rearrange ministries, state committees and general departments,
and to streamline the state admnistrative machinery of the ministries. A ministry's
administrative machinery should not get itself too involved in enterprises; production
and business operations. It is necessary to reduce the number of such intermediate
organs as departments, agencies, bureaux, sections, and to vigorously move to the
direct expert-type work-style; to limit the number ofdeputies at all levels and organs.
Along the guidelines of rearranging the state organs at central level, local people's
committees should also be streamlined, with full powers, duties and managerial
capabilities over the area under their jurisdiction
With respect to the system of socialist legality, the Political Report' stated:
It is necessary to step by step amend and perfect the legal system so as to ensure that
the state machinery be organised and operated in accordance with the law...
The law must be strictly observed; all citizens are equal before the law. As our party is
now in power, all cadres in whatever positions must live and work in strict compli
ance with the law, and be exemplary in observing the law. No-one is allowed to make
use of their power and influence to infringe on the law. Any violation of the law
should be brought to justice. Those who violate the law must be handed over to
judicial organs for trial; their cases should not be handled as 'internal affairs'. .
After me sixth party congress a concerted effort was made to rejuvenate the party
and party-led mass organizations and special-interest groups affiliated with the Viet
nam Fatherland Front The press was encouraged 'to speak straight, speak the truth'
(noi thong, noi that). Greater freedom was given to writers and artists. Party control
over the selection process of deputies to the National Assembly was loosened, and
elected members were given greater scope to express critical views. The combined
effects of economic and political reform led to a wide variety of activity conducted
independently ofparty control, most notably among the press, the video and publish
ing media, war veterans, private entrepreneurs and to a lesser extent among students
and other groups. In all instances the party moved quickly to reassert control. The
sections below will review these developments in greater detail
Political democratization
Party reform, the press andmedia
In the lead up to the sixth party congress in December 1986, widespread criticism of
the party and its policies emerged in the local congresses of the party organization
(Fatseas 1991). This prompted one observer to conclude that:
the most significant aspect of the [sixth] congress was its formal commitment to
democratization of Vietnamese politics. For the first time there was widespread
refusal to accept the absolute authority of the leadership. In local and regional
preparatory meetings lively discussions led to overwhelming rejection of the Political
Report It was ultimately rewritten. A movement to cleanse the party was launched
and in some areas up tohalf or more of the cadres were expelled, h practical terms the
congress became the launching pad for the current movement for political renewal.
The congress called for a revolution from within. This would involve both real
democratization and an overhauling of the party political machinery (Huynh 1988:2).
Vietnam's programme of political democratization arguably made its greatest
impact in the press and media. According to Ha Dang, editor-in-chief of the party
newspaper Nhan Dan, 'the sixth congress of our party stressed that the press should
be not only the mouthpiece of the party and leading bodies, but also a rostrum for the
voices of the broad masses of the people. In short, you could put it like this: the people
know, the people discuss, the people carry out and the people follow up' [dan biet,
dan ban, dan lam, dan Idem tra] (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts , 21 August
1987).
On 25 May 1987 a new column, headed 'Things Which Must Be Done Immedi
ately' appeared in Nhan Dan, over the initials 'N.V.L.' It was thought then, and later
confirmed, that these were the initials of none other than the VCP secretary-general,
Nguyen Van Linn. This article signalled the onset of a period of press liberalization,
an increase in citizen self-expression, and accountability of government officials.
According to one Indochina-watcher, Linn's press campaign had two consequences:
it led to a spate of muck-raking that left government bureaucrats and mid-level party
officials uneasy and it led to the publication of a large number ofnew periodicals (77k
BangkokPost [Alan Dawson], 27 September 1989).
In his column, Linh railed against corruption and other ilk besetting Vietnamese
society. He urged the press and the public at large to play a greater role in reporting on
the actions of corrupt officials and other manifestations of 'negative phenomena' in
social life. He called for the people to submit letters to the editors ofnewspapers and
journals and petitions to appropriate state bodies.
Linh's public call to action was paralleled by in-house efforts by the VCP 'to
purify' (reform) its ranks. A party rectification campaign was carried out from 1987
to 1990 during which period 127,800 members were disciplined and 78,200 ex
pelled2 The Central Committee's sixth plenum, meeting in March 1989, announced
plans to reduce party supervision over state bodies by slashing the number of Central
Committee departments from 32 to twelve (Sydney Morning Herald [Steven
Erianger], 3 April 1989). At the same time, reformers pushed for the convening of a
national party conference, the highest policy-making body below the national party
congress, to weed out party deadwood (ibid ; FarEastern EconomicReview [Murray
Hiebert], 13 April 1989).
Elements of Vietnam's press supported Linh's initiatives and became increas
ingly active in investigating and reporting on cases of corruption and the misuse of
office by party and state officials. In June 1988, for example, the press reported that
506 members of the Cao Bang party organization had been expelled for embezzle
ment of state property and another 391 dismissed for other misdemeanors (Sydney
Morning Herald, 22 June 1988). In one particularly noteworthy case, an investigative
journalist successfully pursued Ha Trong Hoa, the party chief in ThanhHoaprovince
and a memberof the VCP Central Committee. After an inquiry by central authorities,
Hoa was dismissed publicly from all his posts for corruption. In another case,
investigative reporting by journalists forced local authorities to stop hounding a
successful businessman, NguyenVan Chan, to apologize for their heavy-handness, to
return confiscated property and to make compensation for loss of stock (Asian Wall
Street Journal [Barry Wain], 10 July 1990).
In June 1988 Nguyen Van Linn, in a speech to the fifth plenum, acknowledged
that, *[n]ot a small number of party cadres and members have committed numerous
negative practices, and even worse, some have taken a long slide into the muck of
degeneration and degradation' (Far Eastern Economic Review [Hiebert], 13 October
1988). Linh's observations were underscored by survey results whichfound their way
into the press. These accounts revealed that in certain localities between 16 and 36 per
cent of party members had 'serious shortcomings that warrant[ed] disciplinary ac
tion'.
Another survey of nearly 4,600 party members found that 26 per cent had
violated the party's economic regulations. This figure was put as high as 45 per cent
in Ho Chi Minn City. To illustrate behaviour which was considered unacceptable,
Nhan Dan revealed in August 1988 that 'They [party officials] directly hired workers
for production work, engaged in trade or operated as money-lenders' (ibid.). The
army's newspaper, QuanDoiNhan Dan, reported instances where party cadres 'mis
appropriate collective property, seek personal riches...build imposing houses, ride
Honda Cub motorbikes, and have furnished their homes entirely with expensive
imported luxuries'.
The party's new policy of openness (cong khai) encouraged some members of
the public and the press to speak out. But other factors were at work. Vietnam's 'open
door' policy towards the West led to an inflow of foreign ideas. This occurred at the
same time as events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were impacting on
Vietnam. These received coverage in the Vietnamese media. But the degree of liberal
press activity should not be overestimated. According to Huynh Kim Khanh (1988:5)
no more than 30 of Vietnam's 253 newspapers and periodicals actively supported doi
moL
Possibly the most important factor in the liberalization of press activity was
economic. Under doi moi the state phased out its financial subsidies to the press. In
order to survive, newspapers and magazines began to explore popular topics (includ
ing violence and sex) and to accept advertising for the first time. The number of
publications available for sale rose rapidly as did the numberofweekend supplements
and special colour editions. Many publications evaded the regulations on registration.
Others published without formal approval (Hanoi Home Service, 1 5 April 1 989).
In brief, during the period 1987-89 party controls on Vietnam's press were
considerably loosened and this led to an explosion of unsanctioned activity. In July
1989 the Ministry of Information reported that 'papers and publishing houses at
central and local levels have violated regulations on addenda and supplements to
periodicals and special issues, causing a chaotic situation'.
In 1989 party conservatives sought to reimpose party control. In February
Nguyen Van Linn was moved to call on the press in Ho Chi Minn City to tone down
its criticism because this led to a loss of the public's confidence in the party. The last
'N.V.L. ' column was published in March after a four-month period of silence (Nhan
Dan, 21 March 1989).
On 13 July 1989 Ministry of Information took steps to ensure that existing press
rules and regulations were observed. It cancelled all temporary permits and sus
pended eight periodicals for failure to comply with the law. At the same time To Hoa,
the editor of the party's newspaper in the south, Saigon Giai Phong, was forced to
retire. Vu Kim Hanh, editor ofthe popular southern youth newspaper, Tuoi Tre, came
under fire for publishing a frank account of authoritatianism in North Korea.
The conservative counter-reaction was most strident at the seventh plenum ofthe
VCP Central Committee in August 1989 which convened to discuss 'urgent ideologi
cal issues'. This plenum, reacting to efforts by overseas Vietnamese to destabilize the
Hanoi government3 and to events in Poland, as well as to domestic developments,
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roundly rejected bourgeois liberalism and political pluralism. Immediately after the
plenum the VCP initiated a crackdown. Tran Do, a supporter of press openness, was
dismissed from his post as head of the VCP Central Committee Department of
Culture and Arts. New censorship regulations were imposed and many ofthe newspa
pers and magazines which had appeared since 1987 were closed down (The Bangkok
Post [Dawson], 27 September 1989).
Writers, poets and literary publishing houses
At the same time as Vietnam's journalists took pen to paper, several of Vietnam's
writers began to explore the limits of freedom of expression under doi moi. Writer
Nguyen Huy Thiep, for example, wrote a short story, 'Chastity', which hinted mat
eighteenth century hero Nguyen Hue lusted after young women. Was this an allegory
on the life ofHo Chi Minn?4 In another story, Hiep depicted the downtrodden life of
peasants in a remote rural village. Who was to blame for their sorry state? These
stories, published in Van Nghe, the official organ of the Vietnam Writers' Associa
tion, shocked and outraged party conservatives and led to the sacking of thejournal's
editor, Nguyen Ngoc
Female writer Duong Thu Huong raised such subjects as political repression in
Vietnam and the all-pervasive corruption ofprovince-level party officials (in Nhan Vi
Tinh Le ['Big Men in Little Provinces']). In a short story, The Retired General', she
likened the dashed hopes of Vietnam's revolution to aborted foetuses being fed to the
general's dog by bis wife.5 She was also an outspoken advocate for freedom of
thought and expression. Tape recordings of her remarks were smuggled abroad and
printed in the emigre* press. Huong was criticized by colleagues, interrogated by
public security officials, placed under detention and expelled from the party. She was
detained again in 1991 for allegedly passing sensitive state documents to a visiting
Vietnamese-American.
According to one correspondent, the relaxation of the party's grip on everyday
life has also led to the rebirth of Vietnam's salon tradition (too dan) ofpoetry recitals
in sidewalk cafes. Barry Wain describes the opening of the Literature Cafe in the port
city of Haiphong, at which other writers and poets gather to discuss their work,
exchange views and gossip (Asian Wall Street Journal , 23 June 1990).
The loosening of political controls on literary expression, like the loosening of
controls over the press, led to the rapid expansion of the printing and publishing
industry. This too proceeded in an uncontrolled fashion. Some printing houses
blatantly evaded their licences, while others started up without official sanction This
led to an outpouring of all manner of publications, ranging from sex manuals, popular
novels, and pre-1975 literary and historical works, to tracts critical of socialism. The
writings of Thiep, Huong and other authors were also published abroad in the
Vietnamese-language emigre press in Europe and North America and smuggled back
to Vietnam.
The activities of these independent literary publishing houses and Vietnam's
liberally inclined writers quickly brought them into conflict with party conservatives.
Vietnam's doi moi era literature was labelled 'protest literature' and condemned as
egotism (Tap Chi Cong San, March 1989). It too suffered the heavy hand of censor
ship and repression during the crackdown initiated in 1989. In July, for example,
disciplinary action was taken against three publishing houses in Ho Chi Minn City for
publishing books whose contents were not approved or for publishing without a
permit6 It was also reported that two literary magazines published in central Vietnam
were shut down.
In late July-early August 1990 the Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports and
Tourism and the VCP Central CommitteeDepartment ofIdeology and Culturejointly
convened a national conference on 'publication work'. The conference
sternly criticized a number of publishing houses which ... have published a number of
bad, reactionary and decadent works, thus running counter to our party lines and
viewpoints. They have rampantly republished many translations ofbooks, and books
that had been published in the south before 30th April 1975 ('Voice of Vietnam', 2
August 1990).
The party's new hard line was codified in a VCP secretariat directive 'on
strengthening the party leadership over press and publication work' which was issued
on 2 August 1990.
The video cassette industry
One side effect of Vietnam's reform programme, and the loosening of economic
controls, has been the proliferation of radio-casette players, video recorders, and
television sets. This has been accompanied by the increased availability in Vietnam of
foreign films on video. From the onset the government has had difficulty in control
ling this development In 1988, for example, the government suspended and then later
authorized the resumption ofthe showing ofvideo films from non-socialist countries.
Under the terms of Directive No. 87 issued by the Ministry of Culture, the Vietnam
Motion Pictures Union was placed in charge of distributing approved films and
videos to authorized theatres (Hanoi Home Service, 12 November 1988).
According to government estimates made in 1989, there were 40,000 video
recorders in Vietnam of which only half were registered (Far Eastern Economic Re
view [Hiebert], 31 August 1989). There is no estimate of the number of radio-casette
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recorders but these too are freely available on the open market Video recorders
proved to be a lucrative source ofincome not only for clubs, associations and private
owners but also for the military, police, local government and party officials who
were attempting to supplement their meagre incomes (ibid ).
In 1989 the growing private video industry, like the printing and publishing
sector, was reined in by conservative party officials alarmed at what they viewed as
the spread of decadent and pornographic material. There were also a few reported
instances where dissident overseas Vietnamese attempted to use the medium ofvideo
tapes to spread their anti-communist political message.
In July 1989 it was decreed that only government-registered and approved
cultural, cinematographic and hotel services could show videos commercially. All
privately owned video recorders had to be registered with the local cultural affairs
branch. New measures designed to restrict the circulation of videotapes were also
imposed.
Quite plainly, given the domestic and international context in which these de
velopments were occuring, the VCP feared the impact of foreign ideas. Do Muoi, a
senior memberof the VCP Politburo and chairman of the Council of Ministers, stated
as much in a speech to the fourth congress of the Vietnam Writers' Association. He
warned that the illegal importation of video cassettes (and books) would affect the
party's efforts to control the impact of foreign ideas (Hanoi Home Service, 28
October 1989).
NationalAssembly deputies
Probably the second most important manifestation of the democratization process in
Vietnam has been the changing role of National Assembly deputy. This has resulted
from a gradual loosening ofthe party's tight control over the selection process as well
as from official encouragement 'to look the truth in the face, to evaluate the facts
correctly and to tell the whole truth' ('Political Report' 1986).
In elections for the current National Assembly, the candidate-to-seat ratio was
increased. In the most recent elections, held in April 1987 and followed by by-
elections in May, 826 candidates stood for 496 seats; in the previous elections, held in
1981, only 614 candidates stood for the same number of seats. The number of
electoral units was also increased, from 93 to 169, thus making the elected deputy
accountable to a smaller constituency.
In the past, only candidates from the Communist-dominated Vietnam Fatherland
Front were allowed to compete. They were proposed by the local party secretary with
little or no popular input In 1987, reform-minded members of the party used the
democratization process to put pressure on middle-level party cadres to end their
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resistance to change. The rules were altered so that candidates could be proposed at
public meetings. Their biographies were posted in public. According to one veteran
journalist, ' [t]hey have made party officials more vulnerable to public dissatisfaction'
(TheBangkokPost [Paul Wedel], 18 April 1989). The party still retained its final right
of approval, however. A Vietnamese correspondent reported these changes in this
way:
Formerly candidate lists were drawn up beforehand by the party committees, the
administration and the VFF committees concerned, before soliciting voters' opinions.
Therefore, some voters complained that since these candidate lists had already been
decided upon before hand, of what use was it to contribute their opinions? You could
elect anyone you like! Thus, it is clear that voters were deprived of the right to select
and nominate their own candidates and that they refused to make their views known
because they felt angry and, chiefly, feared prosecution.
It is noteworthy that in preparing for these elections the people's ideas have been
respected Electoral steering committees only proposed a number of nominees; gave
accounts of their knowledge, qualifications and capabilities; and affirmed the number
of deputies to be elected at each electoral unit, while the voters selected their own
candidates. Afterwards, two consultative conferences will be held to screen these
candidates, based on recommendations made by voters in areas where these candi
dates live and work....
At all places we visited, we noted that some nominees selected in the first round had
been deleted from the namelist of candidates because the people were not satisfied
with their qualifications... Basically, namelists of candidates were made in accor
dance with proposals made by party comittees' echelons. However, at some places
three candidates were replaced on a list of four nominees after consultations with the
people (Hanoi Home Service, 9 April 1987).
The nature of the electoral campaign changed as well. In the lead up to the 1987
elections, it was clear that the Vietnamese voter wanted tougher action against corrupt
cadres, incentive payments for workers, a labour law to protect those laid off, and
measures to attract foreign investment (Bangkok Post [Wedel], 18 April 1989). These
demands were vocally expressed at public meetings. A Vietnamese journalist who
toured the southern provinces of Tay Ninh, Tien Giang, Cuu Long, and Dong Thap
reported the campaign atmosphere as 'hectic' with use of megaphones, posters, and
banners (Hanoi Home Service, 9 April 1987). The local press and radio stations also
aired the views of contenders. At consultative meetings held to choose candidates
incumbents were criticized.
The process of limited democratization also carried over into the workings of the
National Assembly. According to Nguyen Xuan Oanh, '[ejvery session is now a
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grilling for the Council ofMinisters. It is doing its job ofoverseeing the Government'
(Sydney Morning Herald [Cumming-Bruce], 9 August 1989).7 For example, in late
June 1988 some of the most vocal criticism of the government's performance came
from newly elected deputies. Government ministers were accused by name of mis
handling a food crisis which resulted in starvation in northern Vietnam earlier in the
year and of failing to slow the country's raging inflation.
In July 1988, Tuoi Tre reported that southern assembly members pointedly asked
Agriculture Minister Nguyen Cong Tan why he had 'accepted false reports' late the
previous year about a bumper rice crop in Thanh Hoa and other northern provinces
only a few months before famine struck (Far Eastern Economic Review [Hiebert], 28
July 1988). In 1989, deputies from Ho Chi Minn City backed a petition from local
voters to the chairman of the National Assembly which called for the removal of
Hoang Quy, the Minister ofFinance, and Tran Tieu, his deputy (Saigon Giai Phong,
21 May 1989). Proceedings of the National Assembly were filmed and excerpts were
aired on state television.
The rule of law has been given priority in Vietnam's process ofdoi moL National
Assembly subcommittees have played an increasingly active role in vetting proposed
legislation. This has led to delays and even changes in draft legislation that was once
routinely rubber stamped. For example, at the sixth session of the eighth National
Assembly it was reported that, *[m]ost of the eighteen deputies who spoke... did not
endorse Article 11 of the draft law on the trade unions' responsibility for social
security management; they proposed instead that management of the social security
funds be turned over to the Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Welfare'
(Hanoi Radio, 26 December 1989). A law on the press was amended 27 times before
adoption.
In a major development, National Assembly members for the first time chal
lenged the party Central Committee's nomination for the post of chairman of the
Council ofMinisters, in effect, Vietnam's premier. Reformist deputies demanded mat
at least two candidates be allowed to run. Deputy Nguyen Thi Thi fromHo Chi Minh
City told foreignjournalists that the Assembly presidium pressured the city's delega
tion to accept the party's candidate Do Muoi. But the southerners insisted on nomi
nating Vo Van KieL Both stood for election. Do Muoi won with 64 per cent of the
vote to Kiel's 36. Of significance is that at least 90 per cent of National Assembly
deputies are members of the VCP and at least one third 'crossed the floor' to vote for
KieL
In the lead up to the seventh national party congress held in July 1991, it was
reported mat further democratic changes were being considered. According to one
report, the new chairman of the Council of Ministers will be permitted to name his
own ministers rather than have to accept the Deferred candidates of the party's
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nomenklatura. It has been suggested too that the requirement thatcertain ministries be
headed by party Central Committee members be dropped.
War veterans
In May 1986, in the face ofmounting socio-economic difficulties, former members of
the communist movement in southern Vietnam came together and formed a Club of
Former Resistance Fighters (Cau Lac Bo Khang Chien Cu). The Club was initially a
mutual aid association dedicated to improving the lives of veterans. Its leadership
comprised several notable high-ranking southern party and military figures such as
Nguyen Ho, Iran Bach Dang, Huynh Van Tieng, Iran Van Giao and retired generals
Tran Van Tra, NamLong, Dao Duy Kham and To Ky.
After the sixth congress the activities of the Resistance Veterans quickly moved
from self-help and group discussion to the more overtly political. In 1988 the veterans
held a series of meetings which attracted an increasing audience. The southern
veterans blamed current socio-economic ills on the hasty reunification of the country.
They condemned corruption, incompetence, and party secrecy while calling for
openness, intra-party democracy, personnel changes and the serious implementation
of ddi mdi (Far Eastern Economic Review [Nayan Chanda], 5 October 1989).
Speeches by Club members were tape-recorded and circulated by cassette. They
were also published in a veterans' magazine and newspaper, Truyen Thong Khang
Chien ('Tradition of Resistance'). The security police confiscated the printing plates
and copies of the first edition forcing the editors to shift fromHo Chi Minn City to an
unamed town in the Mekong Delta.
In March 1988, following the death of Premier Priam Hung (officially, chairman
of the Council of Ministers), a southern party veteran, the Club of Former Resistance
Fighters took its first overt political act In April it circulated a petition calling on the
Politburo to withdraw Do Muoi's name as nominee to replace Pham Hung. The
petition attracted over 100 signatures. In June the Club sent the petition to the party
Central Committee and National Assembly urging those bodies to hold a free and fair
election for the premiership by secret ballot
The growing popularity of the Club in 1988 was symbolized by changes to the
masthead of its publication. The first edition of Truyen Thong Khang Chien stated it
was the 'Voice of Ho Chi Minn City' veterans. The second issue changed this to
'Voice of Saigon-Gia Dinh', the pre-unification name for Ho CM Minh City and its
environs. The third issue of Truyen Thong Khang Chien dropped this reference alto
gether and began circulating as far afield as Hanoi. This was the last issue to be
published. It was subsequently replaced by a clandestine newsheet (Far Eastern
Economic Review [Nick Malloni], 29 March 1990).
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The actions by southern party and military veterans, especially their attempts to
link up with counterparts in the north, took place independently of VCP guidance or
control. As such the Club represented a direct threat to the party's mono-organiza
tional8 grip on society. Indeed the Club catered to a large group of party and army
veterans whose basic needs were not being addressed by any other organized body.
The political role of the Club became especially important in 1989 as events in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union began to impact on Vietnam's shores. In early
1990, for example, Nguyen Van Linn called in on Club members in Ho Chi Minh
City to discuss the situation in Eastern Europe.
The VCPreacted to this situation by creating a regime-approved alternate organi
zation, the Vietnam War Veterans Association (Hoi Cuu Cfuen Binh Viet Nam) and
by co-opting individual members of the Club into its leadership.9 Prominent critics
were either pushed aside or detained10The new War Veterans Association (WVA),
while specifically organized to address the needs of the large veterans group, was also
moulded along the lines of other regime mass organizations. A news report on the
draft statutes ofWVA noted, '[fjhis is a mass organization affiliated to the Vietnam
Fatherland Front and under the guide[ance] of the Communist Party of Vietnam'
(Hanoi International Service, 27 March 1990). This was reaffirmed by a decision of
the VCP secretary-general who noted that the VWA 'is a revolutionary mass collec
tive under party leadership and its political and social activities must be carried out in
the framework of the party's line, objective, and policy as well as the constitution and
the state law and that it is affiliated with the Vietnam Fatherland Front' (Hanoi Home
Service, 5 December 1990).
By the end of 1990, the WVA had set up chapters in 44 provinces, cities and
special zones with a membership of 900,000. The views of theWVA were published
in its official mouthpiece, Cuu Chien Binh VietNam ('Vietnamese War Veterans').
Private entrepreneurs
The Vietnam Communist Party was never entirely successful in collectivizing the
economy in the north. During the Air War period (1965-68) there was a partial
reversion to the family-based economy in the countryside. The so-called 'free (or
black) market' was never brought under government control. The 'free market' has
always remained a feature of northern life. Communist efforts to collectivize the
south were spectacularly unsuccessful. There the vestiges of the former free market
economy continued to function in both spirit and practice despite the best attempts of
state officials to shut it down.
Vietnam's adoption of doi moi has led to the proliferation of economic reform
measures and a marked increase in free market practices by private entrepreneurs in
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both the north and south. Much of this activity is so small in scale, dispersed and
widespread that it defies control. Private economic activity extends beyond the realm
of petty merchants, shopkeepers and private businessmen to include the owners and
operators of gambling dens and houses of prostitution as well as the organizers of
illegal departures of the so-called 'boat people'.
In brief, Vietnam's private entrepreneurs have been able to carve out a space for
themselves unfettered by party control. State intervention is more pronounced when
economic activity is on a larger scale. But here again, recent scandals involving credit
cooperatives and the exposure of a fake perfume company provide evidence that at
this level the party-state lacks an effective oversight mechanism. n There is mounting
evidence from southern Vietnam that wholly owned private companies and business
consultancies are springing up and opening contacts with foreign business representa
tives without government control.
Peasantfarmers
Vietnam failed in its attempt to collectivize southern agriculture in the period after
unification. The party's attempts to do so produced a bitter legacy among the owners
of family-operated farms. In 1987-88 peasant discontent boiled over. State attempts
to reverse the collectivization process12 led to the emergence of a series of complex
land disputes among the peasants of the Mekong Delta area (named 'Nam Bo' in
Vietnamese). At the heart of the dispute was the peasants' desire to reclaim land lost
during the collectivization process and the peasants' sense of grievance and abuse at
the hands of corrupt local officials (Far Eastern Economic Review [Hiebert], 19
January 1989). According to one account:
The main purpose of complaints by peasants are to reclaim those pieces of land given
out by themon a mutual assistance basis during the past two land readjustment drives
and to demand the return of various pieces of land, including those portions of land
slashed from their farmland, when the product contract system was first put into
practice, those pieces ofunclaimed land formerly cultivated by them andnow already
taken from them without any land compensation from their places of residence, and
those lands taken from them by state farms but still left uncultivated (Hanoi Home
Service, 22 August 1988).
The land dispute in Nam Bo took the form of petitions and letters of denunciation
as well as public demonstrations and marches in district seats and provincial towns.
The peasants' anger was directed at corrupt local party cadres who allocated land to
their own families. In some cases the peasants roughed up party cadres and seized
back their land outright.
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In September 1988 large numbers of peasants staged a demonstration in front of
the building bousing the Ho Chi Minn City People's Committee. They denounced
provincial officals for obstructing the new land policy adopted earlier in the year. The
Nam Bo peasants received support from members of the Club ofFormer Resistance
Fighters, hi November, one public display included a march through the streets ofHo
Chi Minn City by 300 peasants from the Mekong Delta, some wearing their war
medals. The demonstrators carried banners demanding the return of confiscated land
and the ouster of local officials (termed 'mandarins').
As with the case of the Resistance Fighters, the party was quick to intervene. In
August 1988 a major meeting was convened by the VCP secretariat and the standing
committee of the Council of Ministers in the Delta town of Can Tho (Hau Giang
province) to consider the land problem in Nam Bo. Later that month the VCP
Politburo adopted Directive No. 47 'on resolving some urgent land problems' which
called on party officials and state farms to return land illegally or arbitrarily appropri
ated from the peasants. Furtherhigh-level meetings were held in Ho Chi Minh City in
September and in Hanoi in October after which peasant demonstrations subsided.
The Nam Bo peasant demonstrations were clearly motivated by economic con
siderations. The peasant farmer reacted to changes in landownership ushered in by
ddi mdi, which now recognized individual and private production, by rejecting col
lectivized agriculture in favour of family-based production.
Students
The process of political democratization in Vietnam has led to a greater degree of
intellectual freedom for students and academics. But there are limits to this freedom
and they are widely understood. Students, as well as society at large, are not permitted
to challenge the party's leading role in society nor advocate political pluralism (thuyet
da nguyeri) or multi-party democracy. These might be termed the 'three no's'.
Like other sections of Vietnamese society, Vietnam's student body has not been
left untouched by the process of doi moi. During 1988-89 student discontent mani
fested itself in a series of low-keyed protests and demonstrations in Ho Chi Minh City
and Hanoi. In September-October 1988, for example, it was reported mat in an
unprecedented display of defiance, students in the Economics Faculty of Ho Chi
Minh City held a series of informal meetings, including one 'teach-in', to express
their discontent with restrictive admission policies, an outdated curriculum (including
too much stress on Marxist ideology), the lack ofuniversity autonomy and poor living
conditions (The Nation [Bangkok] , 2 November 1988 [David Storey]; 31 January
1989 [Storey]; 14 July 1990 [Peter Eng]).
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In May 1989 students at the Transport and Communications College in Hanoi
boycotted their school canteen citing the poor quality of their food. They also
demanded better living conditions. Similar but lower-keyed demands were made by
students in other Hanoi colleges —Architecture, Foreign Languages, Teacher Train
ing, Geology and at the Polytechnic. Muted calls were reportedly made for increased
democracy on campus (Alain Boebion, AFP, dispatch from Hanoi, 17 June 1989).
The following month several hundred Vietnamese students demonstrated in front of
the Ho Chi Minn City People's Committee offices for better living conditions
(Sydney Morning Herald [Gimming-Bruce], 9 August 1989).
State authorities moved quickly to diffuse these protests. Education Minister
Tran Hong Quan promised the students at the Economics Institute that a person's
political background would no longer affect admission and that outdated texts would
be rewritten (Far Eastern Economic Review [Hiebert], 20 July 1989). Courses on
market capitalism business management and tourism were introduced. In Hanoi,
government authorities took action to improve the quality of food and living condi
tions. Examination fees were also lowered.
State officials responded to calls for greater democracy by permitting southern
colleges to elect their own rectors. In one instance the party-endorsed nominee lost,
while at the Agricultural University in Can Tho, an American-educated academic was
elected rector (ibid ). Along with these reforms came party-approved experiments in
educational privatization In February 1989 Vietnam's first post-1975 private institu
tion of higher education, Thanh Long University, was founded in Hanoi. This was
followed in August by the opening of the Saigon Private Middle School. It seems
likely mat other private colleges, specializing in mathematics and computer science,
will also be permitted to open. Other reforms included permitting teachers to earn
additional income through private tuition
In August 1989 the Ministry of Higher Education and Vocational Middle
Schools held a major conference in Do Son to review 'performance over the past two
years'. The gathering was attended by 260 delegates representing 73 educational
institutions. According to Vietnamese press accounts, the meeting recognized that
student living conditions were poor and that complaints in this respect were legiti
mate. However, while acknowledging that *[m]any students submitted petitions with
an attitude of good will, calmness and restraint' the press also noted that 'a small
number of extremist and fanatic students have also appeared'.In order to combat such
tendencies, the meeting concluded, it would be necessary to stress ideological educa
tion in the future (Quan Doi Nhan Dan and Nhan Dan, 14 August 1989).
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The seventh national party congress13
The Vietnam Communist Party held its seventh national congress of party delegates
in Hanoi from 24 to 27 June 1991. The congress was attended by 1,176 delegates
grouped into 54 delegations representing Vietnam's provinces, cities, and functional
groups, such as the military and central-level ministry blocs.
The Vietnam Communist Party operates on the basis of democratic centralism
Bom the lead up to and the proceedings of the seventh congress were a reflection of
both principles. Party officials and members of the public were given scope to express
their views in the round of province and district level congresses leading to the
national meeting (democracy). Over 10,000 suggestions were reportedly made to
alter the wording of draft congress documents. Prominent party members and intel
lectuals, like Dr Nguyen Khac Vien,14 Phan Dinh Dieu15 and Hoang Minh Chinh,16
submitted open letters critical ofparty policy and performance. At the same time, the
party maintained its firm control over the political process (centralism). Radical
critics like former party newspaper editor, Bui Tin,17 and writer Duong Thu Huong,18
were expelled from the party.
The national party congress has three main duties: it must review and approve all
reports submitted to it by the Central Committee; amend the party statutes; and elect
the national party leadership. The seventh congress considered five separate major
reports, a record number. These included the all-important 'Political Report of the
Central Committee (sixth congress)' (Bao Cao Chinh Tri cua Ban Chap Hanh
Truong Uong (Wioa VI)), Vietnam's second party platform 'The Platform for Nation
al Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism' (Cuong Linh XayXung Dot
Nuoc Trong Thoi Ky Qua Do Len Chu Nghia Xa Hoi), the 'Strategy of Socio-Eco-
nomic Stabilization and Development of Our Country Until the Year 2000' (Chien
Luoc On Dinh va Phot Trien Kinh Te-Xa Hoi cua Nuoc Ta Den Nam 2000), the
'AmendedParty Statutes' (Dieu le Dang (soi doi)), and the 'Report on Party-Building
and Amendment of Party Statutes' (Bao Cao Xay Dung Dang va sua doi Dieu le
Dang).
At the seventh congress, the Vietnam CommunistParty reiterated its leading role
in Vietnamese society. In doing so it rejected once again multi-party democracy and
political pluralism. The party also declared that it would continue to adhere to the
ideology of Marxism-Leninism and 'the thoughts of Ho Chi Minh' (Nhan Dan
[Nguyen Van Linh], 25 June 1991). The party also recognized the need to carry out a
measured program of political democratization. This entails separating some of the
overlap in party-state functions, giving increasing prominence to the National As
sembly and the role of law.
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The seventh congress adopted a socio-economic development plan up to the year
2000. In general terms, Vietnam will continue with its programme of economic
renewal or doi moi. Domestically this will mean the continued encouragement of a
multi-sectoral economy, including private enterprise. This is not an endorsement of
unfettered market capitalism. The seventh congress made clear that key industries
would remain under central control and that the aim of economic development was
socialism.
Brief mention must be made ofchanges in the party statutes that were adopted at
the congress. Voting procedures for the election of office-bearers were altered and the
secret ballot replaced the traditional public show of hands. Detailed figures were
released on votes taken (Nhan Dan [Dao Duy Tung], 29 June 1991). Other rule
changes included provision for a party conference to be held prior to the next national
congress. In effect, the stewardship of the present leadership will come under review
in mid term and not in five years' time. This is Important as the former secretary-
general, Nguyen Van Linn, attempted to convenejust such a conference several years
ago, reportedly to remove party deadwood. He was successfully thwarted by party
conservatives. It is now reported that the new secretary general, Do Muoi, might step
aside at this mid-term conference in favour of a younger man. 19 Taken together these
rule changes indicate a loosening of voting procedures from imposition by higher ups
in the past to a kind of 'guided democracy' with limited in-puts from below.
The seventh congress also undertook major changes in the composition of the
highest leadership bodies. For the first time no alternate or candidate members were
selected to the new Central Committee. The Central Committee was expanded by 22
members. Initially the party nominated 148 candidates for full membership. An
additional 68 were nominated by delegates, for a total of 216 (Straits Times, 27 June
1991). The congress selected 146 and in so doing rejected several party favourite
sons.
It is clear that the new Central Committee is a much younger and better educated
body than its predecessors. Two thirds of its members are below 60 years of age, but
only three are in their mid- 40s or younger. The average age is 57. Ninety-five have
completed higher education (university or equivalent).20 Women comprise 82 per
cent of the total membership, while the figure for ethnic minorities is 8.9 per cent
The most dramatic leadership changes came with the election of the Politburo.
Seven incumbents were retired — including the former party secretary-general,
Nguyen Van Linh; the cosmopolitan foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach; and the
minister of the Interior, Mai Chf Tho. The average age of the new leadership team
dropped from71 to 64. One member, Nong Due Mann, is a member ofthe T*ai ethnic
minority (his political views are unknown; see below).
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The new thiiteen-member Politburo consists of three identifiable groupings. The
first and most important are the conservative party officials led by Do Muolthenew
secretary-general, and including Dao Duy Tung, Vu Oanh, Pham The Duyet and
Nguyen DucBinhMuoi is the most prominent member of the old guard and has been
likened by one Western ambassador stationed in Hanoi to a 'Confucian referee'
(International Herald Tribune, 28 June 1991). While a supporter of Vietnam's
programme ofeconomic reform, he is a rank conservative when it comes to political
change. He has firm roots in the party apparatus in the northern provinces. Tung is a
member of the VCP secretariat and former head of the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism. Oanh is a member of the VCP Organization Department; Duyet heads the
party apparatus in Hanoi; and Binh heads the Nguyen Ai Quoc higher party school
The second identifiable grouping comprises the military and security complex.
The importance accorded to the military is underscored by the selection of General Le
Due Anh as number 2 and General Doan Khue as number 5. The military has never
been accorded such prominence before. General Anh was commanderofVietnamese
field forces in Cambodia and has recently presided over the demobilization of the
army. Both he and General Khue represent what is probably the largest interest group
in present day Vietnam—retired army veterans. The elevation of Major General Bui
Thien Ngo, deputy minister of the Interior, underscores the party's desire to maintain
internal security and social order. General Ngo was later chosen by the National
Assembly to replace Mai Chi Tho as Interior minister.
The third grouping comprises supporters of reform. They are mainly from the
south with connections to the party committee in Ho Chi Minh City. The foremost
representative of this group is Vo Van Kiet, number 3 in the Politburo. His retention
will keep the supporters of doi moi on side. Others in this group include Le Phuoc
Tho, Phan Van Khai and Vo Tran Chi.
In sum, the congress reaffirmed Vietnam's commitment to the principles of
economicrenewal, but was short on specifics and left it to the new Central Committee
to amend and 'perfect' the major policy documents which had been adopted. At the
time of the congress one Asian diplomatic observer commented:
Vietnam is chasing two rabbits. It is genuinely trying very hard to liberalise, eco
nomically, but at the same time the party wants to retain control At the moment, the
living standard is so low that this can work because all most people want is for their
lives to improve. The demand for luxuries like multi-party democracy are confined to
a handful of intellectuals (quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, 4 July 1991).
In the medium term, therefore, Vietnam's new leaders will be judged on how
effectively they can manage economic reform and bring the benefits of development
to Vietnamese society at large.
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Post-congress developments
Immediately after the seventh party congress, the ninth session (eighth legislature) of
the National Assembly met (27 July-12 August). Two major developments may be
highlighted. First, in line with leadership changes announced at the party congress,
the National Assembly accepted the retirement of three vice-premiers—Vo Nguyen
Giap, Dong Sy Nguyen, and Nguyen Co Thach (also foreign minister) — and three
minsters —Le Due Ann (Defence), Mai Chi Tho (Interior) and Hoang Minh Thang
(State Planning Commission).
Do Muoi, the newly elected VCP secretary-general stepped down from his post
as premier. He was replaced by Vo Van Kiet who received 426 votes out of a total of
444 valid votes (Vietnam News Agency, 9 August 1991).21 The National Assembly
reduced the number of vice-premiers on the Council of Ministers from six to three and
chose Fhan Van Khai (new), and Nguyen Khanh and Tran Due Luong (incumbents).
Table 3 sets out the details of other changes.
Table 3: The August 1991 ministerial reshuffle
















The National Assembly also considered the second draft report ofthe Committee
to Amend the Constitution and recommended that a third draft be prepared and
submitted to the public for consideration. In light of that process, the committee was
requested to draw up a fourth draft and submit it to the tenth session of the National
Assembly in December 1991. In late September the Council of State extended this
deadline to January 1992 after which the eleventh session of the National Assembly
would convene in February or March 'to ratify the amendments to the Constitutions
and a decree on the organization of the state mechanism' (Nhdn Ddn 30 September
1991).
The Committee to Amend the Constitution (Uy Ban Sua Doi Hien Phap) was
originally set up in June 1989 and comprised 28 members under the chairmanship of
the head of the State Council, Vo Chi Cong. The committee held eleven plenary
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sessions in the period up to July 1991. In May 1991 the State Council requested the
committee to submit its first draft ofamendments to the state constitution to a meeting
comprising 'National Assembly deputies, high-ranking and medium-level cadres of
all ministries, sectors, committees and mass organizations at the central and provicial
levels, special zones and cities directly subordinate to the central government' (Nhan
Dan, 4 May 1991). After this meeting, the committee drew up a second draft which it
submitted to the ninth session (eighth legislature) of the National Assembly.
Vietnam's present state constitution was promulgated in 1980 and is the third
state constitution to be adopted (the first was in 1946 and the second in 1959). This
constitution has been amended twice since its adoption. In December 1988 its
preamble was modified to drop hostile references to China and the United States. In
June 1989 the National Assembly amended and supplemented seven articles.22 The
changes proposed in 1991 represent more than cosmetic changes. According to a
report on the constitution delivered by Vo Chi Cong to the ninth session of the
National Assembly:
in view of the substantial changes in the socio-economic situation and the task of
socialist construction and national defence, many points of the 1980 Constitution no
longer suit the new situation.
The line ofrenovation put forward by the 6th party congress in 1986 requires that the
1980 Constitution be amended in order to create a necessary legal groundwork for
accelerating the comprenhensive renovation undertaking and to lead our country
steadily along the socialist path {Nhan Dan, 30 Jury 1991).
A total of '104 of the 147 articles have been revised', according to Vo Chi Cong's
report (ibid).
Two of the most important of the proposed amendments concern the powers,
duties and selection of the head of state and the chairman (premier) of the Council of
Ministers. There are presently two proposals regarding the head of state. Under option
1, the head of state will be directly elected by the National Assembly, and the existing
Council of State and structure of National Assembly standing committees will be
abolished. Under option 2, the head of state will be the chairman of the presidium of
the National Assembly and will be elected by National Assembly members. The
chairman of the presidium would conduct the business of the National Assembly
when it is not in session. The posts of chairman and vice-chairmen of the National
Assembly would be abolished. As public accounts of the July National Assembly
indicated, Committee members, as well as National Assembly deputies, were divided
on this question.
An equally radical amendment is proposed regarding the present structure of the
Council of Ministers. According to Vo Chi Cong's report:
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it is recommended that the Council ofMinisters be abolished and that a government
be set up to operate in accordance with the premiership system under which the
government is led by a prime minister and... the final decisions belong to the prime
minister.
Most recent reports indicate that Vietnam is considering dropping the current
requirement that, with the exception ofdefence, foreign affairs and interior, ministers
be members of the VCP Central Committee. In arrangements recently proposed by
Vo Van Kiet, the new premier would be able to select non-party members as
ministers.
Conclusion
Writing in 1988 Murray Hiebert noted the decline in the salience of ideology in
Vietnam. He quoted one Vietnamese official as observing: '[tjeachers in party
schools no longer know what to teach young people about communism. Many of
them see it as an ideology no longer relevant to Vietnam' . Hiebert then cited foreign
observers as seeing this disillusionment as one of the reasons why more Vietnamese
young people were exploring Buddhism and Christianity (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 13 October 1988). Later that same year, David Marr noted that increasingly
people in Vietnam are organising their lives without reference to the party (Far
Eastern EconomicReview, 3 November 1988). Gareth Porter, in his review ofrecent
changes, has termed the process unfolding in Vietnam as 'creeping pluralism' (Porter
1990:80-81). Barry Warn has argued that despite the party's attempts to maintain its
mono-organizational grip on society, fundamental changes are now underway:
[The party's] hard-line stance belies what is actually happening in Vietnam. Three
years of doi moi, or 'renovation,' have transformed the political as well as the
economic landscape. Many Vietnamese now feel free to say and do almost any
thing— so long as they don't question the supremacy of the Communist Party.
Newspapers expose current corruption while writers uncover the abuses of the past
Politicans openly debate controversial policies. Interest groups, some potentially
powerful, are forming or being reactivated.
The government is walking a tightrope as it attempts to respond to popular demands,
influenced by events in Eastern Europe, while keeping its grip on power. That grip is
slipping, some Vietnamese say, not because the party is being directly challenged but
because the whole system is being loosened by a multitude ofdevelopments....
In this beady atmosphere, officially sponsored mass organizations, such as those
grouping peasants, youth or women, are beginning to question the policies of the
party they have always passively obeyed. Other bodies are being registered or
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revived, outside party control: Although their objectives are largely innocuous —
helping the disabled, restoring temples, assisting the poor—they are nascentpressure
groups that didn't exist before (Asian Wall Street Journal, 13 June 1990).
It may be argued that what is emerging in Vietnam is a nascent form of 'civil
society'.23 According to Robert F. Miller, civil society may be defined as:
a realm of free social and cultural space to be carved out of the all-encompassing
matrix of the totalitarian communist party-state by conscious intellectual and social
action. It was to be a sphere of autonomous, ostensibly non-political social activity,
which did not seek to challenge the state's control over the main levers ofpower and,
indeed, obtained its status through a tacit social contract with the authorities of the
ruling party-state (Miller 1992:5-6).
T. H. Rigby defines civil society 'as consisting of those structures and processes
through which individuals and groups interact autonomously of the command struc
tures of the state in pursuit of their particular concerns' (Rigby 1991:111-112). Rigby
also notes that the term 'civil society' has two dimensions, contractual and traditional
(which he labels Gesellschqft and Gemeinschqft), and emphasizes the former in bis
analysis of developments in the Soviet Union. He concludes by noting:
my definition draws a line between the civil society and specifically the command
structures of the state, not between the civil society and the political order generally.
This reflects my view that if the civil society is to flourish it must not only be in
symbiotic relationship with the political order, but must substantially colonise it and
remake it in its own image. Parliamentary government is the quintessential conse
quence of successful colonization of the political order by the civil society (ibid.: 110).
This paper has illustrated that major changes are under way in Vietnamese
society. It has also attempted to document the increase in socio-political activity
which has taken place as a concomitant of the process of renovation and political
democratization. In several of the examples given above, 'free social and cultural
space' and other ostensibly 'non-political social activity' has been created as a result
of the conscious intellectual action ofindividuals and groups primarily in urban areas.
It is also clear from this discussion that the party has not been able to anticipate let
alone manage and control all facets of this process. However, the growth of such
activity, which is capable of interacting independently of the command structures of
society, has not yet developed a symbiotic relationship with the political order.
Vietnam's system of law and justice is weak and underdeveloped and there is thus
little basis for the contractual requisites of civil society that Rigby suggess are
necessary. It must be concluded that civil society in Vietnam has reached a nascent
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February 1991, pp. 69-74; 13 February 1991, pp. 26-32; and 26 April 1991, pp. 30-35, respectively.
See also, Bui Tin, 'A Dramatic Reversal', Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 March 1991, p. 15.
18 See 'Motbuc thu "tu kiemdieni" cua Duong thu Huong', in Doan Ket(November 1990), reprinted
in DatNuoc 21(June 1991): 21-24.
19 Harish Mehta writing in the Business Times [Kuala Lumpur] 1 Jury 1991 ; this report is based on
conversations with diplomats in Hanoi and Singapore businessmen in Ho Chi Minh City .
20 However, note the cautionary view of veteran observer Nayan Chanda, 'very few intellectuals or
persons with known managerial competence could be identified in the new central committee'
(Asian Wall Street Journal, 5-6 July 1991).
21 Phan Van Khai was also nominated but declined to stand. In 1988, Do Muoi fended offa challenge
by Vo Van Kiel for this position.
22 Namely, Articles 57 (voting rights for citizens), 1 15 (powers and duties of people's councils), 1 16
(term of office for people's councils), 118 (commissions to assist people's councils), 122 (leader
ship of the people's committee), 123 (meetings of the people's committees and people's councils)
and 125 (duties of the chairman of the people's committee).
23 For a more extensive discussion of the term 'civil society' see: Kukathas and Lovell (1991) and
Starr (1988).
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